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Abstract
Developing countries often have rich natural resources but poor infrastructure to capitalize
on them, which leads to significant challenges in terms of balancing poverty alleviation with
conservation. The underlying premise in development strategies is to increase the socio-
economic welfare of the people while simultaneously ensuring environmental sustainability,
however these objectives are often in direct conflict. National progress is dependent on
developing infrastructure such as effective transportation networks, however roads can be
ecologically catastrophic in terms of disrupting habitat connectivity and facilitating illegal
activity. How can national development and conservation be balanced? The proposed Ser-
engeti road epitomizes the conflict between poverty alleviation on one hand, and the con-
servation of a critical ecosystem on the other. We use the Serengeti as an exemplar case-
study in which the relative economic and social benefits of a road can be assessed against
the ecological impacts. Specifically, we compare three possible transportation routes and
ask which route maximizes the socio-economic returns for the people while minimizing the
ecological costs. The findings suggest that one route in particular that circumnavigates the
Serengeti links the greatest number of small and medium sized entrepreneurial businesses
to the largest labour force in the region. Furthermore, this route connects the most children
to schools, provisions the greatest access to hospitals, and opens the most fertile crop and
livestock production areas, and does not compromise the ecology and tourism revenue of
the Serengeti. This route would improve Tanzania’s food security and self-reliance and
would facilitate future infrastructure development which would not be possible if the road
were to pass through the Serengeti. This case study provides a compelling example of how
a detailed spatial analysis can balance the national objectives of poverty alleviation while
maintaining ecological integrity.
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Introduction
Reducing poverty is a dominant theme in sustainable development and the governments of
developing countries are often faced with the problem of how to spend limited amounts of cap-
ital in the most effective way and without compromising their natural resources. Indeed, pov-
erty alleviation is a central mandate for international lending institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and bilateral funding
agencies that recognize the crucial role of integrating people into the economic, social and
political life of the nation [1]. However, despite these common aims there remains much
uncertainty as to the most effective approach to alleviate poverty especially given the risks of
long-term national debt, aid dependency, and ecologically unsustainable practices.
The transition of countries from “developing” to “newly industrialized” is generally marked
by several common features that result from optimizing parallel objectives. These features are:
strong agricultural economies with growing industrial sectors (in particular manufacturing
fuelled by a large well-connected labour force), an open-market economy with access to inter-
national trade especially with neighbours, strong capital investment, and rapid growth of
urban centres with increased social services for citizens. Typically priority actions for poverty
alleviation and economic development include building sustainable livelihoods based on access
to productive land and water, universal access to basic social services, improving entrepreneur-
ial opportunities, credit and micro-financing schemes, technical and administrative training,
and the development of appropriate technologies [1]. However, this development trajectory is
contingent on maintaining healthy ecosystems that are capable of provisioning ecological ser-
vices such as clean water, stable fertile agricultural soils and sources of revenue (such as
through tourism) to the citizens.
How can the benefits of economic development be realized without compromising the natu-
ral resources and ecological integrity on which a country depends? We use a planned transpor-
tation corridor through northern Tanzania as a case-study to compare the relative benefits of
three possible routes in terms of securing people’s basic needs (such as food, education, and
healthcare) and infrastructural support (such as linking to markets, labour, and industry). We
conduct a spatial socio-economic analysis on a broad set of data including the topography of
the landscape, construction costs, travel times, transportation and haulage efficiency, agricul-
tural spin-offs, and the advancement of education, employment, and health opportunities for
the people in the Mara-Shinyanga region. Specifically we aim to find a solution that maximizes
the socio-economic development of the Tanzanian people without compromising the ecology
and exclusive tourism industry of the Serengeti, while simultaneously strengthening the trade
routes that link the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria.
A case study: Tanzania and the Serengeti road
Tanzania is well placed in East Africa to become a major commercial hub of the region. The
country has a long coastline and shares borders with 8 trading neighbours, 5 of which are
completely landlocked. It has experienced 5% to 7% economic growth per annum in the last
decade, yet despite this financial expansion there persists an alarming degree of human poverty
[2]. Recent estimates indicate that as much as 74% of Tanzania’s 44.9 million people live below
the poverty line [2–4]. Although economic projections predict that rural poverty will decline in
the coming years assuming that Tanzania’s GDP continues to rise by 7% per annum, the reli-
ability of these indicators is debatable [5]. Tanzania’s impressive growth forecasts are primarily
due to increased mining and an expanding export market, however continued progress depends
on (i) a favourable global economic environment, (ii) improved efficiency and accountability of
public management and governance, (iii) structural reforms to improve the expansion of small
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and medium sized private enterprises, (iv) strengthened human capital through improvements
to education, health and social welfare of the labour force, and (v) expanded and well-developed
infrastructure such as transportation, electricity and service corridors [3, 6].
Building new infrastructure such as roads is integral for catalysing economic development
in Tanzania [6, 7]. According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic report by the
World Bank, Tanzania requires an additional US$2.9 billion dedicated to development if it is
to achieve par with more developed nations [4]. In particular, the transportation infrastructure
in Tanzania is below the average of other sub-Saharan countries [8]. For instance, only 6.7% of
the 103,706 km of roads in Tanzania are paved which poses a serious impediment to the coun-
try’s development [2]. Shortfalls in transportation capacity, electrical interruptions, and water
supply account for at least a 34% reduction in Tanzania’s potential output [7]. Simulations sug-
gest that improved infrastructure and roads would increase Tanzania’s per capita growth rate
by as much as 3.4% [4].
The development of new roads and infrastructure requires careful planning so as not to
jeopardize the country’s sources of foreign revenue from tourism. In 2010 Tanzania generated
US$1.279 billion from tourism alone [2]. The Serengeti-Ngorongoro ecosystem is the world’s
most famous protected area and is best known for the annual migration of 1.3 million wilde-
beest that support the highest density of predators anywhere in Africa [9]. Currently the reve-
nue generated by tourism in the Serengeti-Ngorongoro ecosystem alone (including entrance
fees for the park and buffering conservation areas, hunting licences, lodge fees, overnight fees)
is in excess of US$100 million / year—a revenue source worth safeguarding. A preliminary
assessment of a road through Serengeti aimed at a capacity of 3,000 vehicles and transport
trucks / day (equivalent to 125 vehicles / hour) [10], which would seriously jeopardize the
exclusive product Tanzania currently markets in the Serengeti (note, more conservative esti-
mates suggest there would be up to 300 transit vehicles / day).
Until now there has been limited analysis of the socio-economic benefits a road would have
for the people in the region (with one notable exception [11]), let alone an economic cost-bene-
fit comparison of all the routes that might justify why a road through the Serengeti is better
than the alternative options. There is a clear and urgent need for a transportation backbone
through northern Tanzania, and given the benefits a road would have, the primary question
remaining is: which route would provide the most economic gain for Tanzania while simulta-
neously improving the social welfare of its people without compromising the ecological integ-
rity and ecosystem services provided by the Serengeti?
Three possible transportation routes. Reports commissioned by the Government of Tan-
zania outline three potential routes to connect the regional road networks of Lake Victoria to
Arusha [10, 12]. These routes (Fig 1) are the Serengeti Route that would follow the Rift Valley
northward to Lake Natron, ascend the escarpment, transit through Loliondo and across the
northern extension of the Serengeti National Park to Mugumu and then pass directly east to
the ports in Musoma on edge of Lake Victoria. A second option would skirt south of the Ngor-
ongoro Crater, around the bottom of Lake Eyasi to Lalago before travelling north to Musoma
via Bariadi (the Eyasi Route). A third route, the Mbulu Route, is similar to the second but
would extend further south connecting Mbulu to Lalago and Bariadi before returning north-
wards to Musoma. Information about the sources of the spatial data sets and details of the GIS
analysis are outlined in S1 Appendix.
Results and Discussion
Ideally a new road should stimulate the economy sufficiently such that over the long term not
only are the initial costs of construction recuperated, but the road will eventually generate
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additional revenue for the country by increasing trade and thereby attracting international
investment (Tanzania’s Medium-Term Public Investment Plan stipulates a 10% economic rate
of return must be met before public funds can be committed) [13, 14]. In addition, a new road
should be placed strategically so that this front-end investment raises the living standards of
the most people and makes the largest contribution to poverty alleviation. Research indicates
that even a limited amount of infrastructure development, such as access to a road, significantly
improves livelihoods by increasing the level of education, health care and provisioning gradu-
ates with better employment opportunities than subsistence agriculture [15, 16]. In the follow-
ing sections we systematically conduct a cost-benefit analysis weighing the socio-economic
spin-offs associated with building each of the proposed roads, against the potential ecological
impacts a road through the Serengeti might have.
Comparison of distance, elevation and construction costs
In a first-pass analysis we used a digital elevation model (DEM) from NASA’s Shuttle Radar
Topology Mission (SRTM) to describe each of the three proposed routes. From this we calcu-
lated the elevation profile of each (S1 Appendix) and compare the costs and potential barriers
Fig 1. Three possible routes for a road connecting northern Tanzania to Lake Victoria. The Serengeti Route is 548km with an elevation gain of 1537m,
the Eyasi Route is 628km and gains 674m, and the Mbulu Route is 692km and with an elevation change of 1099m. Results suggest the construction and
haulage costs would be greatest for the Serengeti Route and least for the Mbulu Route (adapted from [50]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.g001
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that could block the development of roads, railways and pipelines crossing the East African
Rift Valley.
The results of the elevation profile indicate that the Serengeti Route has the greatest and
steepest gradients while the Eyasi Route has the least (Fig 1). The elevation gain of 1537m over
an 80km stretch along the Serengeti Route poses many potential problems. First, the gradient
ascending the Rift Valley walls exceeds 10% in certain sections, which precludes the possibility
of a viable railway associated with the road. Typically a locomotive is capable of pulling half its
normal load on gradients of 1%; a 10% gradient would severely limit the total haulage capacity
of this route. Second, oil and gas pipelines are prone to bursts and catastrophic leakages when
the gradient is greater than 0.8% because of the pressure associated with sudden elevation
changes [17]. The gradient of the Serengeti transit corridor could make this route logistically
unviable for a pipeline that would potentially connect to the Ugandan gas reserves, whereas the
Eyasi or Mbulu Route would be more feasible because the elevation is lower and the gradient is
less. Third, the costs of carving switch-backs and building retaining walls for a road and rail
system along the Serengeti Route would be far greater than either of the other two possible
routes. Currently TanRoads, the government body responsible for the construction and main-
tenance of roads in Tanzania, estimates that a bitumen road of this standard would cost
between 630,000 to 750,000 USD/km, however these estimates double and triple if support
structures such as retaining walls and complex drainage ditches are required [18]. Fourth, the
elevation gain of the Serengeti Route makes it the most costly for road freight. A 10 tonne truck
would require approximately 15.1 litres of petrol to climb the Rift Valley along the Serengeti
Route as compared to 6.6 litres along the Eyasi Route, and 10.8 litres along the Mbulu Route
(or 14.1, 6.2 and 10.1 litres of diesel, respectively) (calculations are described in Table A in S1
Appendix). Therefore, the physical topography of the Serengeti Route makes it the most logisti-
cally challenging with the most expensive haulage costs.
Comparison of road networks and travel times
Ideally the construction of a new road should link together as many other existing roads as pos-
sible to provide an efficient national transportation network that decreases the costs and uncer-
tainty associated with land transport, rather than being an isolated project [7, 19]. The
government of Tanzania is investing heavily in road construction as a means of building its
infrastructure capital and spurring economic growth. Of the 52 current road construction proj-
ects in Tanzania, 18 are funded by the Government of Tanzania, 15 are financed by multilateral
aid, 5 are financed by bilateral aid, 8 by the World Bank, and 6 are funded by the Millennium
Challenge Corporation (www.tanroads.org). Chinese companies account for 72% of the
awarded construction contracts, 9% of the road construction companies are from the East Afri-
can Community, 11% are European, and the remaining 8% are companies from South Africa,
South Korea, and Japan. If a new road through northern Tanzania is placed strategically, it
could be part of a comprehensive interlinked transportation network connecting the Indian
Ocean ports to Central Africa (i.e. the Central Development Corridor; S2 Appendix), or the
trans-African highway linking the east and west coasts [20]. A simple node count of the major
road intersections (i.e. the major trunk roads recognized by TanRoads) suggests that the Seren-
geti Route connects the fewest existing road networks in the region and would contribute the
least to a national transportation network (7, 14, 16 major intersections for the Serengeti, Eyasi,
and Mbulu routes respectively; Fig 1a; Table 1).
The current status and road conditions of each of the 3 proposed routes was also assessed in
order to estimate the total amount of new bitumen that would be required for each route
(Table 1). Although the Serengeti Route is the shortest total distance (548km) it requires the
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most amount of new pavement (428km). The Eyasi Route (628 km total) requires 332 km of
pavement and would connect to 296 km of existing paved road. The Mbulu Route is 63 km lon-
ger than the Eyasi Route (total is 691km) and would connect 288 km of existing road and
would require 403 km of new pavement.
A major objective in building this road is to improve the transit of goods between the Lake
Victoria region and the Indian Ocean, therefore we should not only consider the haulage costs
of the three routes, but also the travel times. The speed limits in Tanzania are tiered by land
zone. The maximum permitted speed for transport trucks is 80km/hr on all national highways
however this drops to 50km/hr in protected areas. Table 2 compares the travel times based on
the distance inside and outside protected areas for each of the three routes. Although the Seren-
geti Route has the shortest distance between Arusha and Musoma, there is effectively no differ-
ence in travel times between it and the Eyasi Route (7 hours 54 minutes as opposed to 7 hours
48 minutes, respectively). The travel time of the Mbulu Route would be about 45 minutes lon-
ger than either of the other two. The Serengeti National Park does not allow night driving,
therefore traffic on the Serengeti Route would face an additional restriction of travelling only
during the 12 hours of daylight.
Comparison of economic returns and taxation
The development of a new road could increase the country’s tax revenue by attracting invest-
ment, generating jobs, and increasing the flow of money [21]. The catalytic effect of a new road
on local economies would be maximized if it (a) provided small and medium sized entrepre-
neurial opportunities to the most number of people, (b) connected the region’s natural
resources such as gold mines and cash crops to the industrial centres, while (c) simultaneously
bringing a large work force from the surrounding districts to the industrial centres [4, 22].
Approximately 70% of Tanzanians live in rural communities where the primary income is
based on agriculture. However, non-agricultural earnings account for 40% of a family’s income
in communities that are connected by roads, which spreads the risk of seasonal unemployment
Table 1. A comparison of the total distance of each proposed route, the current surface conditions, the amount of new paving, the number of
major junctions, and the total human population the road would access.
Proposed
Route
Total
Km
Km
Currently
Paved
Km Currently All-
Seasonal Murum
Km Currently
Seasonal Tracks or
No Road
Km of new
pavement
required
Number of new
junctions (node
count)
Total human
population within
10km
Serengeti
Route
547.8 119.5 219.7 208.6 428.2 7 1,038,901
South Eyasi 628.3 296.0 83.1 249.33 332.4 14 1,687,359
South Mbulu 691.5 288.5 132.2 270.8 402.9 16 1,964,366
Note: The Serengeti Route requires the most amount of new pavement, would be the most costly to build, would contribute least to a national
transportation network, and connects the fewest people.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.t001
Table 2. A comparison of travel times for the three routes based on the maximum allowable speed inside and outside protected areas indicates
there is very little difference between the Serengeti Route and the Eyasi Route.
Proposed
Route
Total Km inside Protected Areas (50 km/hr speed
limit)
Total Km outside Protected Areas (80 km/hr speed
limit)
Total Travel
Time
Serengeti Route 151.1 396.6 7.9 hours
South Eyasi 0 628.3 7.8 hours
South Mbulu 0 691.5 8.6 hours
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.t002
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when crops cannot be cultivated, and provides opportunities for other family members (e.g.
youths, elders, or mothers) to engage in income generating activities for the household [22,
23]. The development of diversified income and non-agricultural enterprises in rural commu-
nities such as small-scale industry and manufacturing are key to poverty alleviation [16]
because they provide alternate sources of income and an economic cushion [23]. Almost 72%
of Tanzania’s GDP in 2010 was based on these small and medium sized enterprises [2], how-
ever their establishment is constrained by a lack of transportation, electricity, and logistical
support from financial institutions rather than a lack of financial capital itself [22]. A well-
placed transportation corridor could improve the success of small and medium enterprises by
developing supply chains, access to regional labour pools, and provide an export market, which
could transform rural areas from a state of agricultural dependency to active economic growth
and diversification [4, 16, 24]. Therefore, it is plausible that the least costly route may also have
the fewest beneficial spin-offs and therefore be an economic or political “white elephant”.
As a means of assessing the potential economic return of a new road we analysed the demo-
graphic data from the 2002 Tanzanian census to determine which route connects the areas of
greatest tax returns with the largest centres of unemployment. The data are collated from house-
hold interviews conducted by enumerators from the Tanzania Bureau of Statistics (S1 Appendix).
The results suggest the Mbulu Route followed by the Eyasi Route would have the greatest
economic potential. Either of these routes would connect more than 900,000 economically
active people located in several centres of high activity (Fig 2a and 2b) with an additional
700,000 unemployed people (Fig 2c and 2d) and would fuel further economic development in
the region. By comparison, the Serengeti Route has approximately 55% of the economic activity
of either the Mbulu or Eyasi routes as well as about half the number of unemployed people.
The low economic returns of the Serengeti Route combined with the large initial costs required
to build it, suggests that it would easily take Tanzania more than twice as long to recuperate the
costs of building the Serengeti Route as it would for either of the two southern routes. This
alone would turn off most international investors and raise alarms for the Tanzanian financial
institutions that are intent on relieving their country’s debt burden [4].
Comparison of current and future agricultural diversification
Currently agriculture accounts for about 28% of the nation’s GDP and supports the livelihood
of about 80% of the population, however the sector has an exceptionally large growth potential
[2]. The Tanzanian government is committed to expanding the agricultural sector as a means
of alleviating rural poverty and boosting the economy through their Kilimo Kwanza policy
(Agriculture First), which aims to avail new land and modernize agricultural techniques
(including the provision of enhanced finance mechanisms, incentives for private investment,
and access to regional markets) [25]. Estimates from 2008 indicate that as much of 34% of the
population are undernourished (predominantly in the under-five age class), even though the
country has the capacity to grow more than enough food for itself. It is possible that a new tran-
sit corridor could not only link existing agricultural centres with regional markets (thereby
having an immediate effect), but also open new areas in which Tanzania’s agricultural sector
could develop in the future [4]. Therefore, in addition to the immediate benefits gained by con-
necting existing agriculture we also investigate the long-term potential of the three routes to
expand agriculture outside protected areas as this might potentially warrant putting a road
where it would not otherwise be considered.
Current agriculture. Ground-truthed satellite remote sensing data from the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO; S1 Appendix) illustrate the majority of cultivation in this
region tends to be annual herbaceous crops such as maize, beans, and cassava (Fig 3a)[26].
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These are typical subsistence food items and are also sold in local and regional markets, but are
rarely traded internationally. There are relatively few areas with perennial shrub crops, such as
cotton, which are typically cash crops and depend on accessing large international markets. Of
the three possible routes, Mbulu currently has the greatest amount of subsistence and cash
crop agriculture (Fig 3b). A road from Mbulu to Lalago would provide best links between agri-
cultural production centres and the regional markets in Arusha, Mwanza and Musoma. By
comparison the Serengeti Route produces less than a third of the agriculture of the Mbulu
Route and has no cash crops.
Livestock are the major source of protein for people during the dry season and are relied on
heavily once the herbaceous crops have senesced; they are also a primary source of income to
rural agriculturalists and pastoralists. We analysed livestock density data from the FAO (S1
Appendix) in relation to each of the three proposed routes (Fig 3c) [27]. The data suggest the
Serengeti Route would access the least livestock, even though this area is dominated by Maasai
Fig 2. A comparison of the socio-economic demographics of the three possible routes. (a) The spatial distribution of economically active people and
(b) the total number of economically active people within 10km of each route (Mbulu = 1,059,436; Eyasi = 919,297; Serengeti = 580,864); (c) the spatial
distribution of unemployment and (d) the total number of unemployed people within 10km of each route (Mbulu = 904,930; Eyasi = 768,062;
Serengeti = 458,037). The data suggest the Mbulu Route would connect the most unemployed people the largest centres of economic activity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.g002
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Fig 3. A comparison of the agricultural productivity of each route. (a) The spatial distribution of current crops (herbaceous crops are generally maize
and beans for subsistence, shrub crops are generally cotton for cash), (b) the total amount of agriculture per kilometre of road; (c) the density of livestock and
(d) the total livestock within 20km of each route. The potential for future agriculture depends on soil fertility and rainfall: (e) the distribution of soil fertility
(estimated from the soil’s cation exchange capacity) and (f) the average soil fertility of each route; (g) the distribution of the mean annual rainfall and (h) the
total annual rainfall along each route.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.g003
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pastoralists known for their animal husbandry skills. The Mbulu Route, however, connects the
highest density of livestock to the greatest number of people thereby improving the access to
regional markets by the most agriculturalists (Fig 3d). Consequently the Mbulu Route would
have the combined effect of improving local economies for the most people, while also provi-
sioning surrounding regions with the largest protein supply during periods of paucity.
Future agricultural potential. Approximately 1.7% of Tanzania’s land mass is currently
under permanent agriculture, however surveys estimate that as much as 11.3% is arable [2].
This discrepancy between Tanzania’s current agricultural output and its potential output is
largely driven by (a) inadequate access and provision of supplies to farmers and (b) few oppor-
tunities for them to sell their products in markets [4]. If the aims of improving and diversifying
the agriculture sector are to be met (as per the Kilimo Kwanza policy), where should these
efforts be focused? In this semi-arid region of Africa, any agriculture depends on fertile soils
combined with adequate rainfall.
The potential for agricultural expansion was assessed by calculating the total mean annual
rainfall and the cation exchange capacity of the soil (i.e. the soil’s ability to release the cations
that are required by plants to grow) for the areas within 10km of each of the three routes (S1
Appendix). The rainfall data are from FAO and United Nations Environment Programme and
the soil data from the Soil and Terrain Database for Southern Africa [28].
The analysis indicates that the soil fertility is greatest along the Serengeti Route (Fig 3e and 3f)
due to volcanic ash deposits from Ol Donyo Lengai that frequently nourish the soils with elements
such as sodium, potassium and magnesium. However, these areas also receive the least amount of
rain (Fig 3g and 3h) so, although they are fertile, much of the region is too arid to support agricul-
ture (i.e. below 600mm/year). Furthermore, many of the areas along the Serengeti Route have
incompatible landuse practices such as pastoralism, hunting and ecotourism and are not zoned
for agriculture [29]. The Mbulu Route has the greatest annual rainfall with moderately fertile soils,
and therefore has the largest potential to support future agriculture making this route the most
valuable prospect of the three, while a road through the Serengeti is the least viable option.
Pastoralism. If the intention of a new road is to alleviate the state of poverty in the Maasai
pastoralists that live to the east of the Serengeti, these benefits are likely to be overshadowed by
significant risks. For instance, the reduced travel time and improved access to pastoral areas
are likely to attract immigrants looking to buy land with the intention of converting rangelands
into croplands. As repeatedly witnessed in other Maasai regions across East Africa (e.g.
Kajiado, Narok, and Monduli), the tendency to convert communal rangelands into fenced
plots with mechanized agriculture leads to the fragmentation of seasonal livestock grazing
areas [14] which ultimately displaces pastoralist people into dryer, lower production landscapes
[30]. This loss of land leads to insecurity especially in poorer households that traditionally
depend on livestock and grazing rights for income, food and even building materials [31]. Fur-
thermore, as immigration into these traditional pastoralist areas increases, the local communi-
ties may struggle to maintain control over their natural resources such as grazing rights and
therefore lose the ability to sustainably manage them [32]. Although poverty is widespread in
the Maasai areas, there is one level of paucity below the current state, and that is Maasai with-
out land. The competitive international trade that a highway would bring poses a distinct risk
for the traditional lifestyle of Maasai people, especially if adequate landuse planning and laws
are not already in place to protect them.
Comparison of relative contributions to childhood education
Currently, 18.3% of the Tanzanian government’s annual expenditure is dedicated to education
however the primary school student-teacher ratio still remains at 51:1 [2]. The challenges in
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educating children are most pronounced in rural areas [33] where the benefits of formal
schooling tend to be undervalued by poor families because there is a perception the cost of edu-
cating children confers no advantages. However, studies show that connecting rural areas to
regional labour markets provides channels for families to generate sufficient income to cover
school fees as well as providing employment opportunities for graduates [15, 16]. This pattern
partially accounts for the increased number of children now completing primary education in
Tanzania (55% in 1991 to 90% in 2010 [2]), however opportunities for secondary and higher
education are not common [33, 34]. The construction of a new road would provision the cru-
cial infrastructural backbone that will eventually lead to mainline electricity, water, mobile
phone communication and internet all of which significantly raises the level of education in
rural areas [15]. If the Serengeti Route improved the provisioning of education to more school
children above that of the alternative routes, this could justify building a road through the
ecosystem.
We ask the question: which route would connect more school aged children to schools and
therefore have the largest impact on educating future generations? Using the demographic data
from the 2002 Tanzanian census, the total number of school aged children within 10 kilometres
of each of the three possible routes were compared. The results (Fig 4a) show that the Mbulu
Route connects twice as many school children as the Serengeti Route. In addition, the Mbulu
Route has the most children living in low-income rural areas and would have the largest impact
on improving rural education opportunities. The Serengeti Route would contribute the least to
the education objectives of the country because it connects the fewest children to schools.
Comparison of impacts to healthcare
The Government of Tanzania faces huge demands in improving the healthcare situation for its
citizens. As much as 56% of rural Tanzanians cannot access suitable health care in less than
one day of travelling, which remains a major challenge for the nation [2, 33]. Treatable diseases,
maternal and prenatal complications, and poor nutritional condition account for 66% of all
deaths [2] in Tanzania. Many of these deaths could be avoided if people had better access to
facilities and if medical facilities were better equipped. For example, there are approximately
0.7 hospital beds and 0.2 nurses per 1,000 people [2] and about 22% of mothers receive no pre-
natal care (maternal death rate hovers just over 4%). Therefore, Tanzania’s healthcare sector
Fig 4. A comparison of the education and health care opportunities for the people living along each route. (a) The total number of school aged
children within 10km of each route partitioned by density and (b) the mean distance (km) to the closest clinic for people living along each route. The results
show the Serengeti route connects the fewest children to schools and is the poorest at connecting rural people to medical facilities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.g004
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faces at least two major challenges: first, to improve the current medical facilities including the
number of doctors, nurses and midwives; and second to ensure fast and reliable access to clinics
especially in rural areas [35].
What is the average distance to the nearest hospital for each route? A strategically placed
road would have the combined effect of connecting isolated hospitals, medical supplies and
expertise to other centres, as well as improving the access to medical facilities for local people.
We compare the average distance to the closest clinic for each of the three routes. Because
there is no geospatial location data for all the hospitals and clinics in the area, we assume that
all towns have at least one clinic according to the mandate of the Tanzanian Ministry of Health
[35]. The location of all towns was determined from the Google Map Maker project and the
distance to each was calculated (S1 Appendix).
The average distance for any person living along the Mbulu Route to a hospital is 16.2 km
(maximum is 53.8km), while the Eyasi Route is 21.4km (69.3km maximum) and the Serengeti
Route is 41.5km (99.6km maximum) (Fig 4b). When this result is considered relative to the
total number of people living along each route, the Mbulu Route would improve the quality of
health and prenatal care to the most people and have the largest immediate impact on Tanza-
nia’s medical sector (i.e. it would bring 1.96 million people to within 16 km of a medical facility
on average). Conversely, a road through the Serengeti would connect 1.04 million people but
would be compromised because there are no medical facilities inside the core protected area.
Ecological impacts
The Serengeti is best one of the best studied ecosystems in the world and is known for the
annual migration of 1.38 million wildebeest and 250,000 zebra [36] which move in a seasonal
pattern between Tanzania and Kenya. The mass migration of animals drives virtually every
other ecological component in the ecosystem, from the diversity of plants and insects, to the
extent of the forests, to the predator-prey interactions [9, 37–40]. In addition, the ecosystem
provisions water, grazing, soil nutrients as well as a vibrant tourism industry for the nation
[41–44].
The Serengeti Route would bisect the migration and cut the ecosystem in half. In addition
to transiting through the core range of a threatened population of black rhino and the endan-
gered wild dog, this route would fracture the migratory path of the wildebeest and zebra. A
recent simulation experiment showed that by separating the wet season calving grounds from
the dry season refuge a road would could reduce the wildebeest population by 30% [45, 46]. A
reduction of this magnitude would permanently change the dynamics of this ecosystem [36],
and concurs with other studies investigating the impacts of roads in many other protected
areas [47–49]. Furthermore, the synergistic effects of a declining wildebeest population and
increased competition for agricultural land would have large negative impacts especially on the
poorest people in the region, many of whom depend on the ecosystem for key resources [11].
Evidence suggests that the knock-on effects of a degraded ecosystem in terms of reduced tour-
ism could reduce foreign revenue, which could alter the national exchange rate and ripple
through the rest of Tanzania’s economy [11].
Conclusions and Future Direction
TheWorld Bank estimates that Tanzania could save almost a US$500 million a year through
institutional reforms and infrastructure development; for instance, every dollar spent on roads
and infrastructure generates US$4 for the Tanzanian economy [4]. Considering the population
of northern Tanzania and the potential economic gain of connecting agricultural communities
to regional centres of trade, it is clear that the country urgently needs a transportation corridor
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to improve the development of the region. This transportation corridor could become the
back-bone that would eventually support electricity lines, high-speed fiber optical cables,
water, and gas pipelines in addition to a road and rail service. Furthermore, a road connecting
the Indian Ocean ports to Lake Victoria (and possibly on towards Rwanda, Burundi, and
Uganda) would be hugely beneficial for the development of these landlocked states and would
provision Tanzania with a remunerative transportation industry. However, care must be taken
so that the economic benefits of a road do not compromise Tanzania’s natural heritage and
tourism industry that generates US$1.279 billion per annum and depends on the conservation
of intact pristine biodiverse areas.
Our independent analysis of the costs and benefits of three possible transportation routes
across northern Tanzania clearly illustrates that the Serengeti Route is the most expensive with
the least economic gain for the nation and risks the largest negative impact on conservation
and tourism (Table 3). This route requires the most amount of new pavement, has the greatest
elevation gain making road and rail transportation hugely inefficient, and has an equivalent
travel time as slightly longer routes to the south of the Serengeti. Conversely, the Eyasi Route
and the Mbulu Route access twice as many people as the Serengeti Route making either of
these routes a politically savvy project for accessing the electorate. The Mbulu Route connects
the most number of unemployed people to economic hubs and would join the largest labour
force to the most entrepreneurial businesses. In addition, the Mbulu Route accesses the best
agricultural areas, has the largest potential for future agricultural developments and links sev-
eral regional supply chains which would improve food security in the region. Furthermore, the
Mbulu Route also connects the most schools and hospitals and makes the largest contributions
towards improving the social welfare of Tanzania’s people. The risks associated with the Seren-
geti Route in terms of threatening the integrity of the ecosystem, degrading its tourism value,
Table 3. A summary of the costs and benefits each of the three potential routes would provide to the economic and social development of northern
Tanzania.
Mbulu
Route
Eyasi
Route
Serengeti
Route
Construction & Haulage Costs Distance Worst Mid Best
Elevation Mid Best Worst
Fuel Consumption Mid Best Worst
Amount of New Pavement Mid Best Worst
Development of New Infrastructure to Boost the
Economy
Links to Existing Road Networks Best Mid Worst
Travel Times Worst Best Mid
Linking Hubs of Economic Activity Best Mid Worst
New Employment Opportunities Best Mid Worst
Tax Revenue Best Mid Worst
Linking Cash Crops Best Mid Worst
Provision of Basic Needs to the Most People Linking Subsistence Agriculture Best Mid Worst
Future Agricultural Potential (i.e. soil quality &
rainfall)
Best Mid Worst
Livestock Best Mid Worst
Protection of Pastoral Lifestyle Best Mid Worst
Education Best Mid Worst
Healthcare Best Mid Worst
Note: The results suggest the Mbulu Route is most likely to meet the 10% economic rate of return threshold that is required for the investment of public
funds while the Serengeti Route is the worst option.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0130577.t003
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and the large costs and poor returns means it has the least long-term benefits for Tanzania
[11].
If national development is to achieve long-term sustainability it must mitigate the ecological
risks. For instance, the development of new infrastructure must provision for people’s basic
requirements, spur the economic growth of industries and expand export markets, while simul-
taneously maintaining the country’s ecological integrity. It is only through detailed and com-
parative analyses that viable economic solutions can be achieved that do not compromise the
health of the ecosystems on which future generations will depend.
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